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Applied and bridge studies study record
Public economics, trade & developmentThe Jurisdictional Arbitrage Floor Theorem: How Sovereign Competition Creates an Irreducible Welfare Cost
STATUS · Manuscript in progressSSRN · Not yet posted
MECHANISM
Identify the incentive structure and the condition that would falsify the claim.
RULE CHANGE
Read the intervention only after the paper shows how the current payoff space fails to support system welfare.
READER USE
Use the summary to see where private gain creates system exposure, then check the study record.
Contribution — what this adds to the conversation
Proves a general impossibility theorem with formal axioms, cross-domain empirical calibration, and policy-relevant coordination threshold.
WHAT'S NEW · First general floor theorem extending tax competition to all mobile-factor domains; unifies 20+ domain-specific results under one axiomatic framework.
The Jurisdictional Arbitrage Floor Theorem (JAFT) proves that when mobile factors (capital, ships, data, waste) can choose among competing sovereign jurisdictions, regulation cannot rise above a floor set by the weakest jurisdiction. This creates an irreducible welfare cost that only multilateral coordination can eliminate. The theorem applies to 20+ domains including tax, environment, labor, and data regulation.