A policy triage tool for the 61-domain research corpus.

ACTION SEQUENCE

Use Policy Lab like an operating manual. Pick one domain and one live decision. Then follow the same sequence every time.

Payday lending example: the lender writes the rollover record, keeps it in the loan file, and produces it to examiners, state banking regulators, state attorneys general, courts, auditors, boards, or plaintiff counsel. The borrower is not asked to solve the problem by reading another disclosure form.

FOR NON-UNITED STATES POLICYMAKERS

Payday Lending and Predatory Consumer Finance

Payday lending is the clean pilot because it has a concrete regulator, a high-volume repeat transaction, an existing abusive-practice hook, and a visible rollover decision where a decision record can be required before the lender acts. The Calabresi-style cheapest-cost-avoider lane is the lender-supervisor channel: the lender controls the rollover decision, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, state banking regulators, and state attorneys general can test that decision through supervision and enforcement. First move: require the lender to complete a detailed decision record before rollover or refinancing. The record must document repayment capacity, loan history, fees, alternatives considered, borrower-impact analysis, and system-welfare field impact. This is a proposed policy design, not current law; it tests whether forcing the lender to create an auditable record changes the permitted transaction set.

Worked translation example: a United Kingdom reader starts with the same payday-lending rollover decision, identifies the Financial Conduct Authority consumer-credit perimeter and any local consultation file, then records the United States consumer-protection hook as an analogy while marking the United Kingdom statutory hook as local verification pending until checked.

Evidence status: model policy path. The pilot uses the bounded Game-Change theorem only where the institutional problem can be specified. Each agency should verify the parties, incentives, missing system cost, cheapest-cost-avoider lane, and available rule change before treating a model rule as transferable. Implementation evidence is needed after a supervisory pilot or rulemaking test.

Pharmacy Benefit Managers

Pharmacy Benefit Management is a clean pilot because it has a concrete regulator, a high-volume repeat transaction, an existing conflict-of-interest hook, and a visible formulary-placement decision where a decision record can be required before the PBM acts. The Calabresi-style cheapest-cost-avoider lane is the PBM-plan-sponsor channel: the PBM controls the rebate-driven formulary decision, and the Federal Trade Commission, CMS, and state insurance regulators can test that decision through their existing market-conduct and rate-review authority. First move: require the PBM to complete a detailed decision record before placing a high-list-price, high-rebate drug on a preferred formulary tier over a lower-cost therapeutic equivalent. The record must document the rebate amount, the net cost to the plan sponsor, the patient out-of-pocket comparison, alternatives considered, and system-welfare field impact. This is a proposed policy design, not current law; it tests whether forcing the PBM to create an auditable formulary-placement record changes the rebate-driven placement pattern the FTC's market inquiry has already documented.²

Worked translation example: a United Kingdom reader starts with the same rebate-driven formulary decision, identifies the NHS drug-tariff and Competition and Markets Authority channels as the closest local analog, then records the United States FTC-inquiry hook as an analogy while marking the United Kingdom statutory hook as local verification pending until checked.

Evidence status: model policy path. The pilot uses the bounded Game-Change theorem only where the institutional problem can be specified. Each agency should verify the parties, incentives, missing system cost, cheapest-cost-avoider lane, and available rule change before treating a model rule as transferable. Implementation evidence is needed after a supervisory pilot or rulemaking test.

Ultra-Processed Food

Ultra-Processed Food marketing to children is a clean pilot because it has a concrete regulator, a high-volume repeat transaction, an existing deceptive-marketing hook, and a visible product-formulation and marketing decision where a decision record can be required before a company markets to a child audience. The Calabresi-style cheapest-cost-avoider lane is the manufacturer-marketer channel: the company controls both the formulation and the marketing-channel decision, and the Federal Trade Commission and Food and Drug Administration can test that decision through the FTC's existing deceptive-practices authority (FTC Act Section 5) and the FDA's food-labeling authority. First move: require the manufacturer to complete a detailed decision record before marketing a product formulated above defined sugar, sodium, or fat thresholds to a child-directed audience. The record must document the formulation thresholds, the audience-targeting method, alternatives considered, and system-welfare field impact. This is a proposed policy design, not current law; it tests whether forcing the record changes the marketing-channel choice.³

Worked translation example: a Mexican reader starts with the same formulation-and-marketing decision, identifies the existing front-of-package warning-label statute as the closest local analog, then records the United States FTC/FDA hook as an analogy while marking the Mexican enforcement-agency contact as local verification pending until checked.

Evidence status: model policy path. The pilot uses the bounded Game-Change theorem only where the institutional problem can be specified. Each agency should verify the parties, incentives, missing system cost, cheapest-cost-avoider lane, and available rule change before treating a model rule as transferable. Implementation evidence is needed after a supervisory pilot or rulemaking test.

Credit Rating Agency Oligopoly

Credit Rating Agency conflicts are a clean pilot because they have a concrete regulator, a high-volume repeat transaction, an existing conflict-of-interest hook already tested in the 2015 DOJ-S&P settlement, and a visible rating-issuance decision where a decision record can be required before the agency issues a rating to an issuer that pays for it. The Calabresi-style cheapest-cost-avoider lane is the rating-agency-issuer channel: the agency controls the methodology-application decision, and the Securities and Exchange Commission can test that decision through its existing Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization examination authority. First move: require the agency to complete a detailed decision record before issuing a rating that deviates from the agency's own published methodology in the issuer's favor. The record must document the methodology deviation, the fee relationship with the issuer, alternatives considered, and system-welfare field impact. This is a proposed policy design, not current law; it tests whether forcing the record changes methodology-deviation patterns.⁴

Worked translation example: a German reader starts with the same methodology-deviation decision, identifies the European Securities and Markets Authority's rating-agency oversight regime as the closest local analog, then records the United States SEC/NRSRO hook as an analogy while marking the German statutory hook as local verification pending until checked.

Evidence status: model policy path. The pilot uses the bounded Game-Change theorem only where the institutional problem can be specified. Each agency should verify the parties, incentives, missing system cost, cheapest-cost-avoider lane, and available rule change before treating a model rule as transferable. Implementation evidence is needed after a supervisory pilot or rulemaking test.

Private Prisons & Carceral System

Private Prisons occupancy-guarantee contracting is a clean pilot because it has a concrete contracting authority, a high-volume repeat transaction, an existing perverse-incentive hook, and a visible contract-renewal decision where a decision record can be required before a government agency signs or renews an occupancy-guarantee clause. The Calabresi-style cheapest-cost-avoider lane is the government-contracting channel: the contracting agency controls the clause-inclusion decision, and the Department of Justice, state corrections departments, and state legislatures can test that decision through procurement policy. First move: require the contracting agency to complete a detailed decision record before signing or renewing a contract containing a minimum-population or occupancy-guarantee clause. The record must document the guaranteed-occupancy rate, the projected fiscal cost of under-occupancy penalties, alternatives considered, and system-welfare field impact. This is a proposed policy design, not current law; it tests whether forcing the record changes the clause-inclusion pattern.

Worked translation example: an Australian reader starts with the same occupancy-guarantee contracting decision, identifies the state corrections-department procurement process as the closest local analog, then records the United States DOJ/BOP hook as an analogy while marking the Australian statutory hook as local verification pending until checked.

Evidence status: model policy path. The pilot uses the bounded Game-Change theorem only where the institutional problem can be specified. Each agency should verify the parties, incentives, missing system cost, cheapest-cost-avoider lane, and available rule change before treating a model rule as transferable. Implementation evidence is needed after a supervisory pilot or rulemaking test.

Coal Combustion

Coal Combustion winterization and reliability investment is a clean pilot because it has a concrete regulator, a high-stakes infrequent decision with catastrophic tail risk, an existing reliability-standard hook already tested after the 2021 ERCOT grid failure, and a visible capital-investment decision where a decision record can be required before a grid operator or generator defers reliability spending. The Calabresi-style cheapest-cost-avoider lane is the operator-regulator channel: the generator or grid operator controls the winterization-investment decision, and FERC, NERC, and state public-utility commissions can test that decision through reliability-standard enforcement. First move: require the operator to complete a detailed decision record before deferring a winterization or reliability-hardening investment previously flagged by a NERC or FERC advisory. The record must document the deferred investment amount, the estimated failure-probability increase, alternatives considered, and system-welfare field impact. This is a proposed policy design, not current law; it tests whether forcing the record changes deferral patterns before the next cold-weather event.⁶

Worked translation example: a German reader starts with the same winterization-deferral decision, identifies the Bundesnetzagentur's grid-reliability oversight as the closest local analog, then records the United States FERC/NERC hook as an analogy while marking the German statutory hook as local verification pending until checked.

Evidence status: model policy path. The pilot uses the bounded Game-Change theorem only where the institutional problem can be specified. Each agency should verify the parties, incentives, missing system cost, cheapest-cost-avoider lane, and available rule change before treating a model rule as transferable. Implementation evidence is needed after a supervisory pilot or rulemaking test.

Tobacco

Tobacco flavored-product marketing is a clean pilot because it has a concrete regulator, a high-volume repeat transaction, an existing addiction-design hook already tested in the Master Settlement Agreement and the ongoing e-cigarette litigation, and a visible product-authorization decision where a decision record can be required before a manufacturer markets a flavored product. The Calabresi-style cheapest-cost-avoider lane is the manufacturer-FDA channel: the manufacturer controls the flavor-formulation and marketing-channel decision, and the FDA Center for Tobacco Products can test that decision through its premarket tobacco product application authority. First move: require the manufacturer to complete a detailed decision record before marketing a flavored product not yet authorized through a premarket tobacco product application. The record must document the flavor-formulation rationale, the youth-appeal risk assessment, alternatives considered, and system-welfare field impact. This is a proposed policy design, not current law; it tests whether forcing the record changes the pre-authorization marketing pattern.⁷

Worked translation example: a Canadian reader starts with the same flavored-product marketing decision, identifies Health Canada's tobacco product authorization regime as the closest local analog, then records the United States FDA hook as an analogy while marking the Canadian statutory hook as local verification pending until checked.

Evidence status: model policy path. The pilot uses the bounded Game-Change theorem only where the institutional problem can be specified. Each agency should verify the parties, incentives, missing system cost, cheapest-cost-avoider lane, and available rule change before treating a model rule as transferable. Implementation evidence is needed after a supervisory pilot or rulemaking test.

FX-Fixing Benchmark Governance

FX-Fixing benchmark submission is a clean pilot because it has a concrete regulator, a high-volume repeat transaction, an existing manipulation hook already tested in the $9B+ DOJ/CFTC/FCA enforcement actions, and a visible rate-submission decision where a decision record can be required before a panel bank submits a benchmark rate. The Calabresi-style cheapest-cost-avoider lane is the submitting-bank-supervisor channel: the bank controls the submission decision, and the Federal Reserve, OCC, and CFTC can test that decision through existing bank-supervisory examination authority. First move: require the submitting bank to complete a detailed decision record before submitting a benchmark rate that deviates from the transaction-based reference rate available to the bank. The record must document the deviation amount, the trading-desk position at time of submission, alternatives considered, and system-welfare field impact. This is a proposed policy design, not current law; it tests whether forcing the record changes submission behavior on the residual survey-based benchmarks that have not yet transitioned to transaction-based administration.⁹

Worked translation example: a Japanese reader starts with the same rate-submission decision, identifies the Financial Services Agency's benchmark-oversight regime as the closest local analog, then records the United States CFTC/Federal Reserve hook as an analogy while marking the Japanese statutory hook as local verification pending until checked.

Evidence status: model policy path. The pilot uses the bounded Game-Change theorem only where the institutional problem can be specified. Each agency should verify the parties, incentives, missing system cost, cheapest-cost-avoider lane, and available rule change before treating a model rule as transferable. Implementation evidence is needed after a supervisory pilot or rulemaking test.