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Formal architecture for the Missing System Theory

Three stated assumptions support one proposed working-paper impossibility claim. Sixty-one studied domain analyses show where the measurement program is being tested. This page assembles the definitions, assumptions, theorem statements, and corollaries so that each claim can be examined on its own terms. Each theorem states the evidence that would narrow or defeat it.
Postnieks, E. (2026). Ranked research corpus · System Asset Pricing Model Program.
Definitions and axioms
Use Propositions when the question is what the formal claim says.
What would weaken it
Use Falsification when the question is what evidence would narrow or defeat the program.
How numbers are produced
Use Methodology when the question is source status, simulation design, or measurement limits.
PUBLIC EVIDENCE SURFACES
Use these surfaces to inspect the formal claims, measurement tables, source status, U.S. coverage, public corpus, welfare-beta method, and stated claim boundaries.
ItemStatusPublic RoutePurpose
Proof/status tableLive/theorems/Separate theorem, bounded theorem, proposition, empirical estimate, conjecture, and proposed mechanism so public copy cannot drift into overclaim.
61-domain evidence tableLive/tables/Make the 61 studied domains, βW, Π, ΔW, admitted simulation intervals, and study links the central evidence spine.
U.S. Policy Lab completionExpanded/countries/us/Show all 61 U.S. domain records before expanding Europe and other jurisdictions.
Public source boundaryDocumented/study/Keep public pages citation-led while reserving unfinished evidence records for scholarly review.
βW methodology and denominator disciplineLive/academic/State that Π means annual industry revenue, never profit, and explain how βW, admitted simulation intervals, and sensitivity limits are produced.
Reader pathsActive routing/Route economists, regulators, policymakers, executives, journalists, and students to the shortest useful path through the canon.
Claims we are not makingNew/academic/Name the boundaries: not peer-reviewed canon, not complete country-by-domain coverage outside verified records, and not proof of implementation.
Not claiming
Peer-reviewed acceptance, complete global implementation coverage, or a universal Game-Change repair rule for every institutional game.
Claiming
An evidence-traced research program with stated assumptions, bounded theorem language, explicit welfare-beta denominator discipline, and falsification targets.
Coverage sequence
Complete additional jurisdiction coverage after the U.S. record, with each route marked by its source and coverage status.
WHAT IS NEW HERE
The single contribution: system welfare W is not a function of the parties' payoffs, by the structure of the payoff space; the System Asset Pricing Model measures the resulting sensitivity (βW, annual system-welfare loss divided by annual industry revenue on the same domain, same time period, and same activity boundary); Decision Accounting makes the decision reconstructable so that the missing system effect becomes visible and auditable at the point of decision.
What follows positions that contribution against the work it builds on and separates what is proven from what is measured, proposed, and open. Proof status is registered at /theorems/; the βW method and denominator discipline are at /credibility/; the publication index is at /publication-roadmap/.
POSITION AGAINST THE LITERATURE
Existing workWhat is already knownWhat the program adds or differs on
Externality theory (Pigou)Pigou established that private activity imposes social costs the price system does not register, and that a corrective tax can internalize them.1The proposed Missing System Theory locates the gap one level earlier, in the structure of the bilateral payoff function itself: W is not a mispriced quantity but a coordinate the payoff space does not contain. βW then measures the size of that omission per dollar of revenue.
Coase theorem and the bargaining frameCoase showed that with clear, tradeable rights and low transaction costs, private parties can bargain to an efficient allocation of an externality without a regulator.2Coasean bargaining runs inside the bilateral payoff space. Under the stated axioms, W is not an argument of that space, so the two bargaining parties cannot price it between themselves. The result is a sibling to the welfare theorems: it names a coordinate the bilateral frame omits, rather than disputing efficiency within it.
Public-goods theoryPublic-goods theory explains under-provision of non-excludable, non-rival goods and the free-rider problem.The contribution is a measurement and accounting method: βW quantifies the per-revenue welfare cost of the shared system, and Decision Accounting records who decided to draw on it.
Arrow (social choice / impossibility)Arrow proved no rule aggregates individual preferences into a social ranking while meeting a few fairness conditions at once.3Arrow's impossibility is about aggregating preferences. The Missing System Theory is about a different axis: bilateral Pareto efficiency versus preservation of a shared system whose welfare is not a function of the two parties' payoffs. It sits in the impossibility tradition without subsuming or being subsumed by Arrow.
Ostrom (commons governance)Ostrom documented that communities can govern shared resources through polycentric institutions, avoiding both privatization and central control.4Ostrom describes governance arrangements that succeed empirically. The contribution here is diagnostic and bookkeeping: a measure of how costly the commons damage is per dollar of revenue, and a record format that makes a decision's effect on the shared system explicit. It complements commons governance rather than replacing it.
Mechanism designMechanism design engineers the rules of a fixed game so that self-interested play yields a desired outcome under private information.Mechanism design optimizes within a fixed game. The bounded Game-Change claim is a transformation between games: when an institutional game is repair-regular, a welfare-improving redesign exists. Decision Accounting is the within-game instrument; the redesign is the prior step. The claim is stated as a bounded existence result.
Accounting and measurementNational accounts (Kuznets) and welfare-measurement critiques (Stiglitz–Sen–Fitoussi) record value and warn that single aggregates can mislead.56βW is a dimensionless ratio fixed to one denominator, annual industry revenue, applied on a common basis across 61 domains. Decision Accounting adds the decision-level record. The aggregate welfare ledger of about amount pending re-estimation is an evidence-traced working estimate, not a national-accounts figure and not a statistical-certainty claim.
Lineage: the program draws on Arrow, Coase, Ostrom, and Holmström7, among others. It claims a contribution to that line of work; priority, citation status, and adoption status belong in the study records.
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
Welfare economics already had the ingredients: external costs, social-choice impossibility, equilibrium, bargaining, mechanism design, commons governance, behavioral decision theory, and GDP critique. The question this program adds is whether the shared system should be carried as its own coordinate in the payoff space and the decision record.
FIELD HISTORY
1920
Arthur Pigou
The Economics of Welfare names the private-cost / social-cost split and supplies the tax logic for internalizing external costs.8
SAPM keeps Pigou's social-cost problem and changes the unit of inspection: βW measures welfare loss per dollar of annual industry revenue, and Decision Accounting asks who recorded the system effect before the decision.
1934
Simon Kuznets
National income accounting gives governments a production ledger, while Kuznets warns that national income should not be treated as national welfare.9
System-Welfare-Adjusted GDP turns that warning into a two-sided ledger. GDP records the positive transaction side; the welfare ledger records the negative system-welfare side. The unsettling finding is that a dollar of measured output can be paired with a large offsetting welfare loss: one step forward, roughly 0.66 steps backward in the current headline calibration.
1944-1951
von Neumann, Morgenstern, Nash
Game theory formalizes strategic choice; Nash equilibrium defines stable strategy profiles where no player can improve by unilateral deviation.1011
MST starts from the player-indexed payoff vector. Standard game theory records the payoffs of the players in the game. The affected system C is not a player, so its welfare is not automatically carried in the payoff vector or the Nash condition.
1951
Kenneth Arrow
Arrow's social-choice impossibility theorem shows that apparently reasonable aggregation requirements cannot all be satisfied at once.12
MST sits in the impossibility-theorem tradition, but on a different axis: it concerns bilateral payoff spaces and the omitted system-welfare coordinate.
1960
Ronald Coase
Coase shows how bargaining over rights can solve externality problems when rights are clear and transaction costs are low.13
The MST question is whether the bargaining frame carries C at all. If C is outside the parties' payoff space, a bargain can look efficient while system welfare falls.
1961-1983
Vickrey, Mirrlees, Hurwicz, Gibbard, Satterthwaite, Myerson
Mechanism design and incentive-compatibility theory show how rules, information, and strategic reporting shape outcomes.14 Myerson-Satterthwaite proves a sharp bilateral-trade impossibility under private information.15
Game-Change is mechanism design for system repair. Mechanism design asks how rules can make self-interested agents reveal information or choose efficient actions. Game-Change asks how to redesign an institutional game so the affected system C becomes payoff-relevant and repair becomes reachable under the stated assumptions.
1979-1985
Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler
Behavioral economics and behavioral finance show that decision-makers use biased, reference-dependent, and institutionally shaped judgment.16
Decision Accounting turns that insight into a management system: structured records, predictions, evidence, alternatives, triggers, and outcome scoring are meant to improve decisions by making reasoning reconstructable.
1990
Elinor Ostrom
Ostrom shows that communities can govern commons through rules, monitoring, graduated sanctions, and local institutional design.17
Ostrom shows that shared systems can be governed when rules, monitoring, and sanctions fit the local resource. SAPM asks how large the welfare loss is when that governance fails. Field 17 asks the decision-maker to name the affected system, boundary, welfare channel, and possible rule change before the decision is approved.
2009
Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi
The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress documents the limits of GDP and recommends broader welfare measurement.18
The bridge to SAPM and System-Welfare-Adjusted GDP is developed below.
STIGLITZ-SEN-FITOUSSI BRIDGE
The 2009 Commission proved the intellectual point: GDP is a production ledger, not a welfare ledger. Its implementation path relied on dashboards, composite indicators, subjective measures, sustainability indicators, and judgment-heavy weighting choices. Those tools named the failure, but they did not give the public a clean negative side of the GDP ledger.
SAPM and System-Welfare-Adjusted GDP supply that missing ledger for the studied domains. GDP records the forward step; the welfare ledger records the backward step. In the current headline calibration, the unsettling result is roughly one step forward and 0.66 steps backward.
POSTNIEKS ORIGIN PATH
1988
Arbel, Carvell, Postnieks
The Smart Crash of October 19th, published in Harvard Business Review, reads the 1987 crash through disciplined empirical valuation and systematic pricing evidence.30
In the author's estimation, this is the seed of the later program: systematic decision rules can beat unaided human judgment when judgment is distorted by cognitive bias.
1993
Postnieks at Tuck
Cognitive Biases: Implications for Investors, Financial Service Firms, and Academics applies Kahneman, Tversky, and Thaler to investment and institutional decision-making.
The later Decision Accounting logic grows from this systems-engineering premise: consequential organizational decisions need designed structures to overcome cognitive biases and give decision-makers tools that encourage rational thought and truthful records.
1998-2009
PCM / Wooster practice
The trading and investment process used the practical predecessors of Decision Accounting fields before the framework had its formal name.
The operating lesson was direct: showing the work improved the work, and comparing predicted returns with actual returns created a feedback loop for improving the investment process over time.
2011
Singularity University
The grand-challenges program exposed the work to the Kurzweil / Diamandis technology thesis: use exponential technology and institutional design on problems measured in trillions of dollars, millions of lives, and planetary consequences.
That grand-challenge lens shifted the target from better investment records to the harder question of why institutions keep producing fines, catastrophes, deaths, lawsuits, and systemic damage. It led Erik to redesign Governance, Risk, and Compliance SaaS, then to formalize Decision Accounting, then to invent the Missing System Theory and the theorem, measurement, and policy tools that support it.
WHY THIS ROUTE LED TO C
The origin story is practical before it is formal: the work started from grand challenges, regulatory reconstruction, GRC software, and lived experience with organizational decisions that looked defensible inside ordinary records while producing fines, system failures, litigation, and preventable harm.
1988 market-crash paper
The first published piece in this path was The Smart Crash of October 19th, co-authored with Avner Arbel and Steven Carvell. In the author's estimation, the practical lesson was that systematic decision rules can beat unaided human judgment when cognitive bias makes markets and institutions misread what is happening.
1993 cognitive-bias paper
The Tuck independent study, Cognitive Biases: Implications for Investors, Financial Service Firms, and Academics, applied Kahneman, Tversky, and Thaler to finance and institutional decision-making. Its durable lesson was that systems engineering is necessary for consequential organizational decisions because bias is predictable, repeatable, and expensive.
PCM decision-record practice
The author's account then moves to PCM. Beginning in the late 1990s, the investment process used practical field equivalents: who owned the decision, what evidence supported it, why the trade existed, what return was predicted, when review was triggered, and how outcomes compared with forecasts. The working lesson was that showing the work improved the work, and that forecast-versus-outcome review made the investment process more disciplined over time.
Prediction feedback loop
The predicted-return / actual-return loop was the core operating discipline. Trades were ranked by expected return, outcomes were measured against those expectations, and forecast error became the raw material for improving the system.
Why Field 17 had to exist
The forced closure of two hedge funds supplied the missing lesson. An organization can optimize the first fifteen fields as carefully as possible and still disappear when the wider system changes in a way the model did not carry. That experience made system welfare the terminal missing variable: a decision record has to study the system that can end the business.
Regulator as end customer
The GRC path focused the design question: the real reader of a consequential decision record is the regulator, examiner, auditor, board, court, investor, or public authority that later has to reconstruct what happened and why.
2011 grand-challenge turn
Singularity University in 2011 added the grand-challenges lens: technology and institutional design should be aimed at problems measured in trillions of dollars, millions of lives, and the future of the planet. In this vision, Decision Accounting is a trillion-scale management science aimed at preventing avoidable catastrophes by giving institutions record discipline before decisions are approved. Decision Accounting led to the Missing System Theory and now incorporates it through Field 17. The research target is a system in which measured progress no longer arrives with a large hidden welfare offset.
The C move
The theorem question became concrete through regulatory work: if standard analysis is built around parties A and B, what changes when the shared system C is made explicit? That question led to the Missing System Theory, then SAPM, System-Welfare-Adjusted GDP, Field 17, Conflictoring, the bounded Game-Change work, and the 61-domain measurement program.
Fifteen-year formalization
The personal lesson was lived before it was formalized. Decision Accounting had been practiced in an advanced form, but the businesses still failed when C moved outside the model. The post-2009 work turned that pain into academic structure: describe Decision Accounting rigorously, state MST, model the missing system variable, explain the mistake, and make the method teachable to other institutions.
Interdisciplinary expansion
The later corpus extends the same grammar across behavioral finance, law, communications, organizational behavior, the natural sciences, systems engineering, computer science, finance, and direct applications to other scholars' work.
The conservative priority claim is narrow: the public site presents MST, SAPM, Decision Accounting Field 17, System-Welfare-Adjusted GDP, Conflictoring, and the 61-domain panel as a connected working-paper program. Priority, citation status, journal status, and adoption status are governed by the publication roadmap and evidence records.
PROPOSED, MEASURED, BOUNDED, OPEN
PROPOSED THEOREM
Under the three stated axioms (overlapping interests, system independence, system dependence), the Missing System Theory is proposed as follows: for a bilateral game with βW = pending re-estimation, no Nash equilibrium has both parties gaining while system welfare is preserved. This is a proposed working-paper theorem, falsifiable against the stated axioms, not ratified field canon.
MEASURED
βW is calibrated across 61 studied domains by Monte Carlo with cited evidence channels and published intervals. The denominator is annual industry revenue, never profit. Estimates are working-paper point estimates; the tenths digit reflects evidence-traced reconciliation, not statistical certainty.
PROPOSED
Decision Accounting is proposed as a 17-field decision-record mechanism. The bounded Game-Change claim applies when the parties, incentives, missing system cost, and available rule change can be specified. The amount pending re-estimation aggregate is an evidence-traced working estimate, not a national-accounts figure. None of these is asserted as settled or adopted.
OPEN
Whether the Game-Change result extends beyond the repair-regular class is open. The revealed-preference βW test (a return signature around restoration events) has not been run. Independent replication and peer review have not occurred. These are stated as not-yet-done, not as pending confirmations.
WHAT THIS DOES NOT CLAIM
Game-Change is universal. The result is bounded to institutional games where the parties, incentives, missing system cost, and available rule change can be specified; the general claim outside that class is open.
Game-Change guarantees full restoration to a (1,1,1) outcome, fast or political implementation, or selection of the improved equilibrium. It is an existence result, not a guarantee of adoption.
The papers are peer-reviewed. They are proposed working papers. Public evidence records and Monte Carlo replication repositories are linked where available; journal or SSRN status is not asserted until a live public record exists.
The $72T aggregate is statistically certain or a national-accounts-grade figure. It is an evidence-traced working estimate built from per-domain channel models.
Boeing or Volkswagen are canonical βW domains. They appear only as illustrations; the 61 studied domains are the measured set.
βW uses profit. The denominator is annual industry revenue. Any record implying profit, margin, market capitalization, transaction value, or market size as Π is a defect to correct.
DEFINITIOND1
Defined termPeer review pending where scholarly claim
System Welfare (W)
PROOF / STATUS NOTE
A vocabulary item used by the program; it is not itself an empirical finding.
FORMAL
Let W: Ω → ℝ be a measurable function on the state space Ω of a shared system (market, commons, benchmark, ecosystem). W is system welfare if and only if W cannot be computed as a function of bilateral payoffs: W ≠ f(πᴬ, πᴮ) for any f: ℝ² → ℝ.
W measures whether the system — the market, the benchmark, the ecosystem, the commons — is healthy. The defining property: you cannot compute it from what A got and what B got. It is genuinely independent information. No amount of bilateral data can reconstruct it. That is the whole problem.
DEFINITIOND2
Defined termPeer review pending where scholarly claim
Welfare Beta (βW)
PROOF / STATUS NOTE
A vocabulary item used by the program; it is not itself an empirical finding.
FORMAL
Average βW = ΔW/Π, where Π is annual industry revenue for the activity or domain being evaluated. The marginal corrective-levy quantity −dW/dΠ is separate and must not be substituted for the average ledger ratio.
Average βW asks how many dollars of annual system-welfare loss are associated with one dollar of matched annual industry revenue. Domain values remain withheld pending evidence-backed re-estimation. A corrective levy uses the separate marginal quantity −dW/dΠ.
DEFINITIOND3
Defined termPeer review pending where scholarly claim
Hollow Win
PROOF / STATUS NOTE
A vocabulary item used by the program; it is not itself an empirical finding.
FORMAL
An outcome (c, a, b) = (0, 1, 1): both private parties gain (πᴬ > πᴬ₀, πᴮ > πᴮ₀) while the system degrades (ΔW < 0). The outcome is Pareto-improving in bilateral space and welfare-destructive in system space.
Both parties win. The system loses. Standard analysis calls this 'mutual gain' and moves on. It is not mutual gain. It is mutual extraction from a shared system that is collapsing. Every framework in negotiation theory classifies this identically to Win-Win-Win. That is the blindness the theorem exposes.
AXIOMA1
Stated assumptionPeer review pending where scholarly claim
Overlapping Interests (Private-Systemic Tension 1)
PROOF / STATUS NOTE
A maintained condition to inspect or reject before evaluating the derived claim.
FORMAL
∃ shared system C such that both A and B derive value from C: ∂πᴬ/∂W > 0 and ∂πᴮ/∂W > 0 for some range of W.
Both parties need the system to be healthy. Benchmark traders need the benchmark to be trusted; regulated firms need the certification regime to remain credible. Hollow Wins destroy the thing the parties depend on while ordinary records still show private gain.
AXIOMA2
Stated assumptionPeer review pending where scholarly claim
System Independence (Private-Systemic Tension 2)
PROOF / STATUS NOTE
A maintained condition to inspect or reject before evaluating the derived claim.
FORMAL
The bilateral payoff function Π(sᴬ, sᴮ) does not include W as an argument. Each party's strategy space and payoff computation are independent of system state.
The parties can compute their own payoffs without knowing what is happening to the system. Their spreadsheets do not have a 'system welfare' line item. This is not laziness — it is structure. The payoff function does not take W as an input. W is outside the space the deal lives in.
AXIOMA3
Stated assumptionPeer review pending where scholarly claim
System Dependence (Private-Systemic Tension 3)
PROOF / STATUS NOTE
A maintained condition to inspect or reject before evaluating the derived claim.
FORMAL
∃ feedback function η: ΔW → ΔΠ with η > 0, such that system degradation eventually reduces private payoffs: if ΔW < 0 persistently, then ∃ T* such that ΔΠ < 0 for t > T*.
The damage comes home. Degrade the system long enough and private revenue can collapse. T* is the domain-specific crossover estimate; it must be calibrated from the domain record rather than copied from a retrospective case.
PROPOSED THEOREMT1
Working-paper theoremPeer review pending where scholarly claim
The Missing System Theory
PROOF / STATUS NOTE
Presented with a proof boundary and falsification target; peer review and independent replication are pending.
FORMAL
Proposed working-paper theorem: under Private-Systemic Tension-1, Private-Systemic Tension-2, and Private-Systemic Tension-3, for any bilateral game with βW = pending re-estimation, no Nash equilibrium exists in which πᴬ > πᴬ₀, πᴮ > πᴮ₀, and ΔW ≥ 0 simultaneously. The cooperative surplus visible to bilateral analysis is temporally unstable with duration T* = δ/(ηλ).
Three axioms. One proposed working-paper impossibility. If the axioms hold and β is above 1.0, the result says there is no equilibrium where both parties gain and the system survives. The claim is structural, but it remains a falsifiable working-paper theorem rather than settled canon.
COROLLARYC1
Derived claimPeer review pending where scholarly claim
Group Decision Support System Blindness
PROOF / STATUS NOTE
Depends on the stated theorem and axioms; it narrows if the theorem or an axiom narrows.
FORMAL
Most existing Group Decision Support Systems (INSPIRE, SmartSettle, Negoisst) operate in the bilateral payoff space {πᴬ, πᴮ}. Under Private-Systemic Tension-2, no Group Decision Support System that monitors only bilateral payoffs can detect or prevent a Hollow Win outcome.
Every negotiation support system deployed today — INSPIRE, SmartSettle, Negoisst, GMCR — is structurally blind to system welfare. They optimize for the thing that produces Hollow Wins. The tool designed to help is constitutively incapable of detecting the problem.19202122
COROLLARYC2
Derived claimPeer review pending where scholarly claim
Temporal Instability
PROOF / STATUS NOTE
Depends on the stated theorem and axioms; it narrows if the theorem or an axiom narrows.
FORMAL
For any Hollow Win with βW = pending re-estimation, ∃ T* = δ/(ηλ) such that the outcome transitions from (0,1,1) to (0,0,0) or (0,0,1) or (0,1,0) at t = T*. The transition is discontinuous when η is threshold-dependent (regulatory enforcement, market collapse, legal liability).
Every Hollow Win has an expiration date. When it expires, correction can be discontinuous. The cooperative surplus was real, but temporary; T* is computable only from the domain-specific δ, η, and λ inputs.
PROPOSITIONP1
Proposition / estimatePeer review pending where scholarly claim
Monte Carlo Convergence
PROOF / STATUS NOTE
A bounded analytic or empirical claim, not a canonical theorem unless separately stated.
FORMAL
Under N = 100,000 independent draws with triangular, lognormal, and uniform channel distributions, the βW estimator converges to the population mean with standard error < 2% for all domains with 3+ channels.
The legacy 100,000-draw runs are reproducible executions of configs whose channel spreads and denominators require evidence review. They are diagnostic artifacts. Public intervals resume after cited channel inputs, independent revenue denominators, source receipts, and rerun hashes pass the measurement gate.
PROPOSITIONP2
Proposition / estimatePeer review pending where scholarly claim
System-Welfare-Adjusted GDP
PROOF / STATUS NOTE
A bounded analytic or empirical claim, not a canonical theorem unless separately stated.
FORMAL
GDP* = GDP − μ · Σᵢ Wᵢ, where Wᵢ = βWᵢ · Πᵢ is the welfare cost of domain i, Π is annual industry revenue, and μ ∈ [0, 1] is the chosen shadow-price pass-through into national accounts. The current welfare ledger reports about amount pending re-estimation in annual system-welfare cost; any GDP* figure is a conditional accounting transformation, not a separate measured fact.
The welfare ledger and the GDP adjustment are different claims. The ledger records the current working estimate of annual system-welfare cost across the 61 studied-domain slate. System-Welfare-Adjusted GDP asks how much of that cost should be subtracted from national accounts under a stated shadow-price pass-through. This site treats any GDP* number as conditional on an explicit price vector and allocation rule.
Fifteen selected impossibility theorems span 217 years, from Condorcet (1785) to List and Pettit (2002). Each addresses a distinct structural problem — preference aggregation, rights and efficiency, bilateral trade under information asymmetry, strategy-proofness, apportionment, matching, or judgment aggregation. The Missing System Theory addresses a different axis: bilateral Pareto efficiency versus system welfare preservation. Whether it extends that tradition is for the profession to evaluate against the stated axioms.

CITATION GENERATOR

These are working-paper citation templates. Public evidence records and Monte Carlo replication repositories are linked where available; SSRN/journal status is not asserted until a live public record exists.
FOUNDATIONAL THEOREM
Postnieks, E. (2026). The Missing System Theory: Bilateral efficiency and system welfare cannot coexist under three stated axioms. Working paper.
Working paper; public evidence record pending
DECISION ACCOUNTING
Postnieks, E. (2026). Decision Accounting: Principles and practice. Working paper.
Working paper; public evidence record pending
FULL PROGRAM
Postnieks, E. (2026). The System Asset Pricing Model program: 61 studied domains. Available at https://decisionaccounting.org.
WEBSITE →
PER-DOMAIN CITATION TEMPLATE
Postnieks, E. (2026). [Theorem Name]:
  An [Impossibility/Intractability] Theorem
  for [Domain]. Working paper.
  Evidence record: pending public posting
  MC: github.com/epostnieks/sapm-mc-[slug]
REPLICATION
The 61 studied domain papers have source and simulation records. Replacement Monte Carlo packets are being admitted domain by domain; each admitted record will carry source receipts, input assumptions, code, and output hashes needed to reproduce its βW estimate. Legacy repositories remain diagnostic until their inputs clear the new evidence gate.
NOTES & REFERENCES
  1. Pigou, A. C. (1920). The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan. link. ↩
  2. Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44. link. ↩
  3. Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley. link. ↩
  4. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons. Cambridge University Press. link. ↩
  5. Simon Kuznets, National Income, 1929–1932, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., S. Doc. No. 124 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934). link. ↩
  6. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (2009). link. ↩
  7. Holmström, B. (1979). Groves' scheme on restricted domains. Econometrica, 47(5), 1137–1144. link. ↩
  8. Pigou, A. C. (1920). The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan. link. ↩
  9. Simon Kuznets, National Income, 1929–1932, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., S. Doc. No. 124 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934). link. ↩
  10. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944). link. ↩
  11. John F. Nash, "Non-Cooperative Games," Annals of Mathematics 54, no. 2 (1951): 286–295. link. ↩
  12. Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley. link. ↩
  13. Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44. link. ↩
  14. Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8–37; Clarke, E. H. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11(1), 17–33; Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41(4), 617–631. link. ↩
  15. Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983). Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 29(2), 265–281. link. ↩
  16. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291; Thaler, R. H. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1(1), 39–60. link. ↩
  17. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons. Cambridge University Press. link. ↩
  18. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (2009). link. ↩
  19. Kersten, G. E., & Noronha, S. J. (1999). WWW-based negotiation support: Design, implementation, and use. Decision Support Systems, 25(2), 135–154. link. ↩
  20. Thiessen, E. M., & Soberg, A. (2003). SmartSettle described with the Montreal Taxonomy. Group Decision and Negotiation, 12(2), 165–170. link. ↩
  21. Schoop, M., Jertila, A., & List, T. (2003). Negoisst: A negotiation support system for electronic business-to-business negotiations in e-commerce. Data & Knowledge Engineering, 47(3), 371–401. link. ↩
  22. Kilgour, D. M., Hipel, K. W., & Fang, L. (1987). The graph model for conflicts. Automatica, 23(1), 41–55. link. ↩
  23. Kersten, G. E., & Noronha, S. J. (1999). WWW-based negotiation support: Design, implementation, and use. Decision Support Systems, 25(2), 135–154. link. ↩
  24. Thiessen, E. M., & Soberg, A. (2003). SmartSettle described with the Montreal Taxonomy. Group Decision and Negotiation, 12(2), 165–170. link. ↩
  25. Schoop, M., Jertila, A., & List, T. (2003). Negoisst: A negotiation support system for electronic business-to-business negotiations in e-commerce. Data & Knowledge Engineering, 47(3), 371–401. link. ↩
  26. Kilgour, D. M., Hipel, K. W., & Fang, L. (1987). The graph model for conflicts. Automatica, 23(1), 41–55. link. ↩
  27. Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley. link. ↩
  28. Sen, A. K. (1970). The impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Journal of Political Economy, 78(1), 152–157. link. ↩
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© 2026 Erik Postnieks · System Asset Pricing Model Program · Independent Researcher · Salt Lake City