Browse by subject:
DEEP DIVE

Welfare-beta explorer across 61 studied domains

Use this route to inspect the System Asset Pricing Model domain panel, revenue-denominator discipline, and policy paths. The public beta-W rankings and aggregate are withheld while each domain receives an independently sourced denominator, channel distributions, dependence structure, and Monte Carlo result receipt. Domain Tables and Policy Lab provide the framework and policy paths while the numerical re-estimation proceeds.

Plain English: beta-W asks how many dollars of system welfare are lost for each dollar of annual industry revenue. Legacy point estimates and interval bands are withheld while the channel evidence and revenue denominators are rebuilt. The replacement panel will show each admitted result's declared draw count, seed, assumptions, and rerun receipt.

Missing System Theory remains proposed working-paper theory, not peer-reviewed canon. Its core result is a proposed bounded working-paper theorem under stated assumptions, and Game-Change claims are bounded existence results for repair-regular games, not guarantees of restoration, political adoption, or equilibrium selection.

Public numerical rankings: re-estimation required. The site will display admitted beta-W results after the source packets and independent simulations pass the release gates.
OPEN DOMAIN TABLESVERIFY IN EVIDENCE NOTEOPEN POLICY LABREAD BETA-W METHODOLOGY
SYSTEM ASSET PRICING MODEL

The Missing System Theory

© 2026 Erik Postnieks
pending DOMAINS·16 THEOREMS·Mean welfare beta = pending

Program Overview

The System Asset Pricing Model quantifies the welfare cost of private optimization
CALIBRATED DOMAINS
pending
0 impossibility · 0 intractability · 0 control
MEAN WELFARE BETA
pending
Median: pending
IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS
16
1785–2026
COMPANION DASHBOARDS
37
+ System-Welfare-Adjusted GDP
PROPOSED WORKING-PAPER RESULT
For any bilateral interaction satisfying three axioms — overlapping interests, system independence, and system dependence — no Nash equilibrium exists in which both private parties gain and system welfare is preserved. The Missing System Theory (Postnieks 2026a) is presented as a proposed working-paper result: the cooperative surplus visible to bilateral analysis is temporally unstable when βW > 1.
βW

Welfare Beta Distribution

Welfare beta (βW) = annual system-welfare loss (ΔW) divided by annual industry revenue (Π) — log scale; bars colored by class
Impossibility · 0
Intractability · 0
Control group · 0
Complete welfare-beta panel — 61 domains
Exact βW, the source-derived 90% Monte Carlo interval, and the impossibility / intractability / control class for every domain.
Impossibility · 0Intractability · 0Control group · 0
#DomainβW90% CIClass
NOTES & REFERENCES
  1. The Missing System Theorem — this program's paper establishing that the system-welfare coordinate is not a function of the parties' payoffs. summary. ↩
  2. The Missing System Theorem — this program's paper establishing that the system-welfare coordinate is not a function of the parties' payoffs. summary. ↩
  3. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Notice of Violation of the Clean Air Act issued to Volkswagen AG (Sept. 18, 2015). link. ↩
  4. Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (Paris: De l'Imprimerie Royale, 1785). link. ↩
  5. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951). link. ↩
  6. Amartya K. Sen, "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy 78, no. 1 (1970): 152–157. link. ↩
  7. Leonid Hurwicz, "On Informationally Decentralized Systems," in C. B. McGuire and Roy Radner, eds., Decision and Organization (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1972), 297–336. link. ↩
  8. Allan Gibbard, "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica 41, no. 4 (1973): 587–601. link. ↩
  9. Mark A. Satterthwaite, "Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions," Journal of Economic Theory 10, no. 2 (1975): 187–217. link. ↩
  10. Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont, "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica 45, no. 2 (1977): 427–438. link. ↩
  11. Bengt Holmström, "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica 47, no. 5 (1979): 1137–1144. link. ↩
  12. Michel L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young, Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). link. ↩
  13. Alvin E. Roth, "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research 7, no. 4 (1982): 617–628. link. ↩
  14. Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory 29, no. 2 (1983): 265–281. link. ↩
  15. Hervé Moulin, "Condorcet's Principle Implies the No Show Paradox," Journal of Economic Theory 45, no. 1 (1988): 53–64. link. ↩
  16. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica 68, no. 2 (2000): 309–342. link. ↩
  17. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, "Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle," Journal of Political Economy 109, no. 2 (2001): 281–286. link. ↩
  18. Christian List and Philip Pettit, "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy 18, no. 1 (2002): 89–110. link. ↩
  19. The Missing System Theorem — this program's paper establishing that the system-welfare coordinate is not a function of the parties' payoffs. summary. ↩
© 2026 Erik Postnieks