Applying the System Asset Pricing Model
Decision Accounting

Applying the System Asset Pricing Model to Frontier AI: Measuring the System Welfare Cost of the Capability-Safety Gap

core-claim
Core claim

Frontier AI destroys 7.51 of welfare for every 1 of private payoff

The paper calibrates the System Asset Pricing Model (SAPM) to frontier AI, finding a system beta of 17.96. Each dollar of frontier-model revenue is paired with $7.51 in welfare loss.

sapm-analogy
SAPM analogy

SAPM translates CAPM from market risk to social loss

The paper builds on the familiar CAPM structure: beta measures systematic risk. In SAPM, βW = W/Π, where W is annual welfare cost and Π is annual private payoff.

calibration
Calibration

Six welfare channels sum to $225.4B per year

The paper decomposes welfare cost across six empirically grounded channels, each with data sources and dollar estimates.

monte-carlo
Monte Carlo

100,000 draws never produce a welfare-positive median

The Monte Carlo simulation uses lognormal/normal/triangular distributions across channels. P(βW < 1) = 0.0000%.

impossibility
Impossibility theorem

Three axioms make voluntary governance impossible before Q2–Q3 2027

The Alignment Ceiling Theorem (Postnieks 2026a, Theorem 20) proves that under Capability Competition, Deployment Necessity, and Irreversible Diffusion, no voluntary arrangement can reduce βW below the critical threshold before the Oversight Crossover Point.

oversight-crossover
Oversight crossover

Human supervision becomes structurally unreliable by mid-2027

Using METR's empirical doubling law (task-completion horizon doubles every 4–7 months) and Engels et al.'s oversight degradation function (success rate < 52% at 400 Elo gap), the crossover point is estimated at Q2–Q3 2027.

institutional-gap
Institutional gap

Break-even efficiency is 0.87; observed efficiency is 0.12

The paper computes the institutional correction efficiency μ required for welfare neutrality. μ* > 0.87, but observed voluntary commitments achieve only 53% compliance and 17% model weight security compliance, yielding μ̂ ≈ 0.12.

governance-failure
Governance failure

Voluntary commitments fail: 53% average compliance, 0% on security

The paper prices governance failure as a welfare channel: $16.3B/yr from institutional underperformance. Only 2% of AI research addresses safety; capability scaling consumes >95% of compute investment.

pigou-coase
Why Pigou and Coase fail

Both canonical externality frameworks break on frontier AI

Pigouvian taxation requires a stable taxable unit and observable marginal social cost — capability is multi-dimensional and doubles every 4–7 months. Coasean bargaining requires reversibility — open-weight diffusion makes capability non-recallable.

cross-domain
Cross-domain ranking

Frontier AI ranks 19 of 61 SAPM domains, in critical-urgency tier

The paper places frontier AI in the critical-urgency tier (βW > 5.0). Cross-domain comparability lets policymakers rank AI against other systemic risks like PFAS contamination or antimicrobial resistance.

what-changes
What changes

The result shifts AI governance from voluntary to regulated

The paper's impossibility theorem implies that voluntary governance cannot close the welfare gap. Mandatory pre-deployment safety evaluation (EU AI Act model), compute governance, and international coordination are required to shift the game from a voluntary race to regulated development.