Applying the System Asset Pricing Model
Decision Accounting
Applying the System Asset Pricing Model to Frontier AI: Measuring the System Welfare Cost of the Capability-Safety Gap
core-claim
Core claim
Frontier AI destroys 7.51 of welfare for every 1 of private payoff
The paper calibrates the System Asset Pricing Model (SAPM) to frontier AI, finding a system beta of 17.96. Each dollar of frontier-model revenue is paired with $7.51 in welfare loss.
- Private payoff Π = $30.0B/yr (frontier-model race revenue)
- System welfare cost W = $225.4B/yr (six channels)
- System-adjusted payoff ΠSA = −$195.4B/yr — industry is welfare-negative
sapm-analogy
SAPM analogy
SAPM translates CAPM from market risk to social loss
The paper builds on the familiar CAPM structure: beta measures systematic risk. In SAPM, βW = W/Π, where W is annual welfare cost and Π is annual private payoff.
- CAPM: E[Ri] = Rf + βi(E[Rm] − Rf)
- SAPM: βW = W/Π, ΠSA = Π − W
- Frontier AI calibration: βW = 17.96, 90% CI [5.5, 10.4]
calibration
Calibration
Six welfare channels sum to $225.4B per year
The paper decomposes welfare cost across six empirically grounded channels, each with data sources and dollar estimates.
- Fraud and cybercrime: $24.0B/yr
- Labor displacement: $104.4B/yr
- Capability-safety gap: $29.4B/yr
- Market concentration: $39.2B/yr
- Governance failure: $16.3B/yr
- Irreversible diffusion: $12.0B/yr
monte-carlo
Monte Carlo
100,000 draws never produce a welfare-positive median
The Monte Carlo simulation uses lognormal/normal/triangular distributions across channels. P(βW < 1) = 0.0000%.
- Median βW = 17.96, 90% CI [5.5, 10.4]
- Welfare multiplier κ = 7.51 (= W/Π)
- System welfare ratio SW = 0.117 — only 11.7 cents of each dollar remains
impossibility
Impossibility theorem
Three axioms make voluntary governance impossible before Q2–Q3 2027
The Alignment Ceiling Theorem (Postnieks 2026a, Theorem 20) proves that under Capability Competition, Deployment Necessity, and Irreversible Diffusion, no voluntary arrangement can reduce βW below the critical threshold before the Oversight Crossover Point.
- Capability Competition: firms cannot slow scaling without losing market share
- Deployment Necessity: revenue requires deploying models with unverifiable safety
- Irreversible Diffusion: open-weight replication within 3–8 months
oversight-crossover
Oversight crossover
Human supervision becomes structurally unreliable by mid-2027
Using METR's empirical doubling law (task-completion horizon doubles every 4–7 months) and Engels et al.'s oversight degradation function (success rate < 52% at 400 Elo gap), the crossover point is estimated at Q2–Q3 2027.
- AI reasoning complexity exceeds human real-time supervisory capacity
- After crossover, scalable oversight success rates drop below 52%
- Current trajectory: capability doubles every 4–7 months
institutional-gap
Institutional gap
Break-even efficiency is 0.87; observed efficiency is 0.12
The paper computes the institutional correction efficiency μ required for welfare neutrality. μ* > 0.87, but observed voluntary commitments achieve only 53% compliance and 17% model weight security compliance, yielding μ̂ ≈ 0.12.
- Required efficiency μ* = 0.867 — must close 86.7% of welfare gap
- Observed efficiency μ̂ ≈ 0.12 — sevenfold gap
- 11 of 16 White House signatories score 0% on model weight security
governance-failure
Governance failure
Voluntary commitments fail: 53% average compliance, 0% on security
The paper prices governance failure as a welfare channel: $16.3B/yr from institutional underperformance. Only 2% of AI research addresses safety; capability scaling consumes >95% of compute investment.
- White House voluntary commitments: average compliance 53%
- Model weight security compliance: 17% average, 11 of 16 at 0%
- Open-weight replication lag: ~3 months (Epoch AI 2026)
pigou-coase
Why Pigou and Coase fail
Both canonical externality frameworks break on frontier AI
Pigouvian taxation requires a stable taxable unit and observable marginal social cost — capability is multi-dimensional and doubles every 4–7 months. Coasean bargaining requires reversibility — open-weight diffusion makes capability non-recallable.
- No regulator can price harm at capability pace
- Administrative recalibration lags the technology
- 8 billion affected parties cannot bargain; information asymmetry is severe
cross-domain
Cross-domain ranking
Frontier AI ranks 19 of 61 SAPM domains, in critical-urgency tier
The paper places frontier AI in the critical-urgency tier (βW > 5.0). Cross-domain comparability lets policymakers rank AI against other systemic risks like PFAS contamination or antimicrobial resistance.
- System beta tier: Critical (βW > 5.0)
- Impossibility status: Active (Theorem 20 triggered)
- Temporal urgency: Crossover estimated Q2–Q3 2027
what-changes
What changes
The result shifts AI governance from voluntary to regulated
The paper's impossibility theorem implies that voluntary governance cannot close the welfare gap. Mandatory pre-deployment safety evaluation (EU AI Act model), compute governance, and international coordination are required to shift the game from a voluntary race to regulated development.
- Mandatory safety evaluations (EU AI Act model)
- Compute governance: export controls + threshold reporting
- International capability race pause mechanism
- Liability framework for frontier AI harms