Credibility After the Contract
Decision Accounting

Credibility After the Contract

core-claim
Core claim

Credibility depends on whether a stranger can reconstruct the decision

The paper defines public-contract credibility as a function of reconstructability: Cred(C, t+δ) = f(R(Dt)). If the record cannot produce a verifiable narrative of what was decided, by whom, why, under what authority, and what triggers reconsideration, credibility tends to zero over time.

flawed-game
Game structure

The bilateral game drops system welfare from the payoff space

In G = A, B , the state agency optimizes political stability and budget adherence while the firm optimizes profit. System welfare, Dimension C, is outside the payoff function even when both parties depend on it.

hollow-win
Outcome taxonomy

The Hollow Win looks successful inside the A-B game

The paper’s 8-outcome taxonomy identifies the Hollow Win as (C=0, A=1, B=1): contract terms appear satisfied, the agency saves face, the firm profits, and the public system degrades.

theorem-1
1

A record that fails FMST has zero credibility over time

The Reconstruction Credibility Theorem states that Cred(C, t+δ) = 0 if and only if FMST(Dt) = False. The missing element can be what, who, why, authority, or trigger.

theorem-2
2

Non-reconstructable sequential decisions converge to the Hollow Win

The Hollow Win Convergence Theorem states that limδ→∞ P((C=0, A=1, B=1) R(Dt)=∅) = 1. Later amendments, waivers, and extensions repeatedly externalize system welfare costs.

beta-w
Measured loss

The paper estimates βW = 8.4 for public infrastructure procurement

βW measures system welfare destroyed per dollar of annual industry revenue. For a typical $50B revenue sector, the paper attributes the loss to delayed or failed delivery, forensic reconstruction, and trust erosion.

case-carillion
Carillion

Carillion collapsed after awards the government could not explain

Carillion’s January 15, 2018 liquidation left £7B in liabilities and more than 400 stalled public projects. The paper uses the case to show a complete reconstruction gap around continued awards after financial distress was visible.

case-carillion-payoff
Carillion payoff

Carillion’s bilateral wins shifted £19.3B of welfare loss to the system

The case maps directly to (C=0, A=1, B=1): agencies gained short-term delivery and political cover, Carillion extracted private gains, and taxpayers, subcontractors, pensioners, and users absorbed the losses.

reconstruction-mandate
Reconstruction mandate

A material decision does not count unless it has a 17-field DA record

The proposed rule moves evidence upstream: no material decision affecting a public contract counts as made without a contemporaneous Decision Accounting record, including Field 17 for system welfare impact.

theorem-3
3

The mandate changes payoffs by pricing documented welfare degradation

In G₁ = A, B, C , the payoff functions subtract expected sanctions when C=0: π′A = πA - λA(1-C)PenaltyA and π′B = πB - λB(1-C)PenaltyB. With sufficient detection and penalties, (0,1,1) no longer pays.

reform-dividend
Reform dividend

The βW reduction comes from removing reconstruction and trust costs

4 states that βW falls from βW₀ to βW₁, with βW₁ < βW₀/2 within one budget cycle under a reconstruction mandate. The proof argues that CostReconstruction and ErosionTrust disappear when records are complete.

falsification
Falsifiability

The framework stands or falls on reconstructable records changing outcomes

The paper gives empirical tests rather than treating the mandate as self-validating. A fully reconstructable record that still reaches Hollow Win at the same rate as a non-reconstructable one would refute the core causal claim.