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Applied and bridge studies study record
Decision Accounting & recordsThe Capture of the Conflictoring Cure: Why the Regulator Cannot Be Captured by What It Already Owns
STATUS · Manuscript in progressSSRN · Not yet posted
MECHANISM
Identify the incentive structure and the condition that would falsify the claim.
RULE CHANGE
Read the intervention only after the paper shows how the current payoff space fails to support system welfare.
READER USE
Use the summary to see where private gain creates system exposure, then check the study record.
Contribution — what this adds to the conversation
The paper proves three propositions: (1) Stiglerian capture and fiscal capture are substitutes, not complements—the presence of one eliminates the marginal benefit of the other; (2) the Conflictoring regulator cannot be captured by the industry because it already shares the industry's payoff function through the fiscal dependency mechanism; (3) the Stigler objection commits a category error by treating a structural equilibrium as a behavioral outcome.
WHAT'S NEW · Stiglerian capture and fiscal capture are substitutes, not complements. Under fiscal dependency above the critical threshold, the industry's marginal benefit from capture is zero. The Conflictoring regulator cannot be captured because it already shares the industry's payoff function. The Stigler objection commits a category error by treating structural failure as behavioral.
The paper refutes the George Stigler objection to the Conflictoring framework, proving that a regulator structurally dependent on industry revenue cannot be captured by that industry because it already shares its payoff function. Three formal propositions show that Stiglerian capture and fiscal capture are substitutes, capture is impossible under fiscal dependency, and the objection commits a category error.