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SOUTH AMERICA
Antigua and Barbuda
2 domains mapped · Code: AG
These are jurisdiction-specific research-progress records. They expose first moves, likely actors, and institutional infrastructure where mapped; they are not a claim that every country has a finished statutory memo for all 61 domains.
NON-UNITED STATES TRANSLATION RULE
For countries with fewer than 10 mapped domains, use the United States 61-domain map as the reference corpus, then translate only domains with locally verified regulators, authority hooks, statutes, or dockets.
Antigua and Barbuda has a GDP of about $2.2 billion (2024, World Bank), driven overwhelmingly by tourism and a long-standing offshore financial and international-business-company sector. The market-failure domains most material to it are Tax Havens / Offshore Finance, where the country has faced repeated FATF and EU listing pressure and hosted the Stanford International Bank fraud, and Fisheries, where reef-dependent coastal stocks face tourism and climate pressure.
DOMAINS (2)
Tax Havens / Offshore Finance (international business companies, offshore banking)
βW = 1
Canonical domain beta-W
Canonical domain beta-W from Tax Havens and Offshore Finance. Local route severity is a country-route triage value and is not used in the aggregate portfolio.
Axiom 1
Axiom 2
Axiom 3
PRIMARY ROUTE:The welfare cost is computable because the offshore sector is small relative to GDP, licensing flows through a single national regulator, and the country already shares a common regulator and currency through the OECS and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, making capital flight and revenue erosion measurable. The 2009 Stanford International Bank collapse demonstrated the local fiscal and reputational damage from one captured institution.
4 actor-lane actions mapped
GAME-CHANGE ROUTES
A1Adopt and enforce OECD/Global Forum automatic exchange of information (CRS) and beneficial-ownership registries through the Financial Services Regulatory Commission, removing the secrecy that creates the welfare drain
A2Use Eastern Caribbean Central Bank and OECS coordination to set common substance and licensing requirements so no member competes by lowering standards
A3Implement the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) recommendations to clear FATF grey-listing and align with the EU tax-cooperation list
ACTOR-LANE ACTIONS
Insider / Whistleblower
insider
Compliance officers at licensed international banks report shell-company beneficial-ownership gaps to the Financial Services Regulatory Commission
Financial Services Regulatory Commission (FSRC); Office of National Drug and Money Laundering Control Policy (ONDCP)
Investor / Capital Allocator
investor
Correspondent banks condition relationships on verified CRS reporting and beneficial-ownership transparency
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB); correspondent banks; Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange
Regulator / Agency
regulator
FSRC enforces beneficial-ownership registry and revokes licenses for non-compliant IBC agents
Financial Services Regulatory Commission; Ministry of Finance and Corporate Governance; Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
Policymakers / Treaty Forum
supranational
OECD Global Forum monitors CRS implementation and peer-reviews exchange of information
OECD Global Forum on Transparency; Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF); CARICOM; Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
Fisheries (reef and coastal small-scale fishery)
βW = 1.11
Canonical domain beta-W
Canonical domain beta-W from Fisheries. Local route severity is a country-route triage value and is not used in the aggregate portfolio.
Axiom 1
Axiom 2
Axiom 3
PRIMARY ROUTE:The fishery is small-scale and reef-dependent, so stock depletion and reef degradation from tourism and climate pressure are directly observable and the welfare cost is computable against landings data. Antigua and Barbuda already manages its fishery through national legislation and the regional CRFM, giving an existing institutional channel for quota and reef protection.
4 actor-lane actions mapped
GAME-CHANGE ROUTES
A1Expand marine protected areas and enforce no-take zones through the Fisheries Division to let reef stocks recover
A2Adopt CRFM-coordinated catch limits and gear restrictions across the OECS so effort does not simply shift between islands
A3Tie tourism levies to reef restoration and fishery monitoring, internalizing the coastal-pressure externality
ACTOR-LANE ACTIONS
Insider / Whistleblower
insider
Local fishers and dive operators report illegal gear and undersized landings to the Fisheries Division
Fisheries Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Barbuda Affairs; fishing co-operatives
Investor / Capital Allocator
investor
Tourism developers and hotels fund reef restoration as a condition of coastal concessions
Green Climate Fund; Caribbean Development Bank; tourism investors
Regulator / Agency
regulator
Fisheries Division sets and enforces catch limits, closed seasons, and marine protected areas
Fisheries Division; Department of Environment, Ministry of Health, Wellness and the Environment
Policymakers / Treaty Forum
supranational
Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism coordinates regional stock assessments and harmonized rules
Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM); FAO; Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States; Cartagena Convention (UNEP Caribbean Environment Programme)
REFORM PATHFINDER
Actor-lane actions and institutional infrastructure for Antigua and Barbuda
POLICY LAB
Country-specific policy options for the mapped domains in Antigua and Barbuda; full 61-domain coverage is the program table, not a claim about this route.
© 2026 Erik Postnieks · Independent Researcher · Salt Lake City